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ABSTRACT
In recent months, COVID-19 has become a global pandemic and
had a huge impact on the world. People under different conditions
have very different attitudes toward the epidemic. Due to the real-
time and large-scale nature of social media, we can continuously
obtain a massive amount of public opinion information related to
the epidemic from social media. In particular, researchers may ask
questions such as "how is the public reacting to COVID-19 in China
during different stages of the pandemic?", "what factors affect the
public opinion orientation in China?", and so on. To answer such
questions, we analyze the pandemic related public opinion infor-
mation on Weibo, China’s largest social media platform. Specifi-
cally, we have first collected a large amount of COVID-19-related
public opinion microblogs. We then use a sentiment classifier to
recognize and analyze different groups of users’ opinions. In the
collected sentiment orientated microblogs, we try to track the pub-
lic opinion through different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Furthermore, we analyze more key factors that might have an im-
pact on the public opinion of COVID-19 (e.g., users in different
provinces or users with different education levels). Empirical re-
sults show that the public opinions vary along with the key fac-
tors of COVID-19. Furthermore, we analyze the public attitudes
on different public-concerning topics, such as staying at home and
quarantine. In summary, we uncover interesting patterns of users
and events as an insight into the world through the lens of a major
crisis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of COVID-19 is officially recognized as a pandemic
by the World Health Organization(WHO) on March 11, 2020. The
pandemic has made a huge impact on the world today. People can
clearly feel the impact of the epidemic. In China, the COVID-19
epidemic has generated an outburst of public opinions in the Chi-
nese Sina-Weibo. In this paper, we try to answer the question of
how public opinion change with the development of COVID-19
pandemic in China and figure out what key factors may cause the
change of public opinion. Since public sentiment is a good indica-
tor of public opinion, so we disentangle these problems by analyz-
ing the sentiment changes of the public on social media websites.
We divide the collected data into different groups according to
two criteria: (1) geographical differences and (2) educational differ-
ences. Since the first case infected by COVID-19 was identified in
Wuhan in December 2019, multiple countries and regions reported
infected individuals. During different stages of the outbreak, peo-
ple in different regions showed different sentiment orientations.
Education background is another factor we are interested in. Peo-
ple with different education levels may have different opinions on
certain social events about COVID-19.
People’s attitudes towards the Chinese and United States gov-
ernments during the COVID-19 outbreak are also interesting, since
the government issued policies that directly influence people’s daily
lives. Therefore, we analyze people’s opinions towards the govern-
ments of China and the United States.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We collect large-scale data from Sina-Weibo and analyze
public opinion on COVID-19 using textual information.
• We analyze and find different factors (e.g., education lev-
els, regions, gender, epidemic trends) that affect the orienta-
tion of the public sentiment towards the Chinese and United
States governments and social events in China.
• The extensive analyses show that our collected data are in-
formative and the factors we analyzed have a significant im-
pact on the public opinion.
2 RELATED WORKS
In recent years, due to the booming development of online social
networks, web information plays a significant role in shaping peo-
ple’s beliefs and opinions. With misinformation and disinforma-
tion, such online information can easily affect online social net-
work users, in turn having tremendous effects on the offline soci-
ety. Therefore, public opinion analysis is important for monitoring
and maintaining social stability.
Research studies on social media have pointed out how social
media reflects [8] or affects [12] the thoughts of different social
groups. Badawy et al. [2] analyze the digital traces of political ma-
nipulation related to the Russian interference of the 2016 US Pres-
idential Election in terms of Twitter users’ geo-location and their
political ideology [3]. Wang et al. compare the Twitter followers
of the major US presidential candidates [17, 18] and further infer
the topic preferences of the followers [19]. More closely related
to this study, [7, 9] explore the impact that disasters have on the
underlying sentiment of social media streams. Our research draws
knowledge from the body of research on characterizing the demo-
graphics of social media users, along the dimensions such as gen-
der [4, 14, 18], age [11, 15], and social class [1, 15].
Sentiment analysis is a popular research direction in the field of
social media. In this field, may natural language processing (NLP)
technologies are employed to capture the public sentiment towards
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certain social events and analyze the causality of the public senti-
ment. The majority of past approaches employed traditional ma-
chine learning methods such as logistic regression, SVM,MLP, and
so on trained on lexicon features and sentiment-specific word em-
beddings (vector representations of words) [6, 10]. Best perform-
ing models of this breed include Thongtan and Phienthrakul [16]
which proposes training document embeddings using cosine simi-
larity and achieves state-of-the-art on the IMDB dataset [10]. Yin
et al. [21] use Distributional Correspondence Indexing (DCI) - a
transfer learning method for cross-domain sentiment classification
and achieve the first place on the Webis-CLS-10 dataset [13]. In
our study, we collected 99,913 sentiment-labeled Weibo posts and
900,000 unlabeled Weibo posts. To make the samples more rep-
resentative and improve the reliability of the analysis results, we
bootstrap the sentiment labels using a sentiment classifier. Finally,
we use a classifier to predict the education background labels for
users.
There are already some qualitative and quantitative analysis
works related to social media information of COVID-19. Yin et al.
[20] propose amultiple-information susceptible-discussing-immune
model to understand the patterns of key information propagation
on the social networks. Cinelli et al. [5] address the diffusion of
information about COVID-19 with massive data on Twitter, Insta-
gram and YouTube. The main difference between our work from
these works is that we try to track the Chinese public opinion dur-
ing different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic and analyze some
key factors (e.g., education levels, gender, region, epidemic trends)
that might have an impact on the public opinion of COVID-19.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data collection
We collect a large-scale Sina-Weibo corpus from two sources. First,
we use the dataset provided by the Data Challenge of The 26th
China Conference on Information Retrieval (CCIR 2020).1 as the
seed data for classifier training. Second, we crawled microblogs on
Sina-Weibo with COVID-19-related keywords. After we obtained
the COVID-19-related microblogs, we further collected the corre-
sponding user information from Sina-Weibo and the number of
crawled user profiles is 710,073. The first data source covers the
microblogs from Jan. 1 to Feb. 18 and the second data source covers
the microblogs from Feb. 19 to Apr. 15. According to the epidemic
trend (the number of newly infected is descending in China and
the number of newly infected is increasing outside China), data
from Jan. 1 to Feb. 18 is marked as stage 1 and data from Feb. 19 to
Apr. 15 is marked with as stage 2.
3.2 Classifier
Our collected dataset contains 999,13Weibo microblogs with man-
ually labelled sentiment polarity (positive, negative or neutral). We
use these data to train a sentiment classifier. Specifically, we use
the Fasttext 2 framework to implement the classifier. We use 30%
of the labelled data to validate the classifier and its precision is
68%. Based on our experience, this is on par with the performance
1https://www.datafountain.cn/competitions/423/datasets
2https://fasttext.cc/
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Figure 1: Where are the microblogs on the pandemic from?
of VADER [7] on tweets. We then use the classifier to predict the
sentiment polarity for the remaining unlabeled data.
For the topics of concern, the corresponding keywords and sim-
ilar expressions are used to filter the related microblogs.
3.3 Sentiment Analysis
Using the timelines of the COVID-19 pandemic summarized by
Wikipedia3, Ding Xiang Yi Sheng4 and China Daily5 , we are able to
identify key events during different stages of the pandemic. These
key events and the Weibo data with sentiment label enable us to
track the public opinion with the sentiment polarity. In order to
provide an intuitive measure of the public opinion, we define a
Sentiment Index as follows:
SentimentIndex =
(Positive − Neдative)
(Positive + Neдative)
(1)
where Positive or Neдative represents the number of positive or
negative microblogs. The Sentiment Index varies in the range of
(−1, 1), where 1 represents pure positive and −1 represents pure
negative (ignoring neutral microblogs). We build the index to cap-
ture the overall trend of the public sentiment.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Volume
In this subsection, we mainly discuss this question: Who is dis-
cussing COVID-19 on the Internet considering the geographical
distribution? Based on the geographical information provided by
the users, Figure 1 showss the number of uploaded microblogs
from different regions. ‘Other’ refers to users who mark there lo-
cations with the label ‘Other’. Because the U.S. is the world’s only
current superpower, Japan is near China and issued quite different
policies compared with the U.S., we list these two representative
countries separately. It should be noted that ‘Overseas’ refers to
overseas users except the users whose profiles are labelled with
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_COVID-19_pandemic
4https://dxy.com/
5http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
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Figure 2: Sentiment proportion of stage 1
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Figure 4: Sentiment Index of stage 1
‘U.S.’ or ‘Japan’. In other words, ‘Overseas’ refers to all countries
other than China, the U.S., and Japan.
As shown in Figure 1, a preliminary observation is that the num-
ber of microblogs from the regions with higher GDP per capita is
more than the lower GDP regions considering the administrative
divisions of China. For example, Beijing and Shanghai discuss the
pandemic even more than the most intensely hit areas by the pan-
demic, such as Hubei.
4.2 Overall Sentiment
This subsection intends to answer two questions: How does the
public sentiment varywith different stages of COVID-19 pandemic?
What are the public opinions of different groups of users?
4.2.1 Public opinion on different stages. Figure 2 shows the senti-
ment proportion and Figure 3 shows the number of different senti-
ments from Jan. 1 to Feb. 18. A direct observation is that most of the
microblogs hold a neutral attitude towards the pandemic. Consid-
ering the polarity of the opinions, there is a significant decline of
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Figure 5: Sentiment proportion of stage 2
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Figure 6: Number of microblogs of stage 2
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Figure 7: Sentiment Index of stage 2
the proportion of positive microblogs from Jan. 19 to Jan. 25. Also,
most of the microblogs were posted after Jan. 19. Figure 4 shows
the Sentiment Index from Jan. 1 to Feb. 18 and a significant decline
could be observed near Jan. 20.
Based on the timeline, we can find two related key events: (1)
COVID-19 was announced to be Human-to-human transmissible
on Jan. 20. (2) A quarantine of the Greater Wuhan area beginning
on Jan. 23was announced on Jan. 22. The influence of the these key
events on public opinion is clear. We regress the Sentiment Index
against the number of days from Jan. 1 on the two parts divide by
Jan. 21, respectively, and report the regression coefficients (coef.)
and t-statistics (t) as: (1) Part-1. coe f . = 0.0177; t = 5.169;P > |t | :
0.000; and (2) Part-2. coe f . = 0.006; t = 16.533;P > |t | : 0.000.
Overall, the opinion was positive towards the pandemic and the
sentiment was becoming positive after the decline.
Figure 5 shows the sentiment proportion and Figure 6 shows
the volume from Feb. 19 to Apr. 15. A decrease of positive senti-
ment proportion can be observed from Feb. 28 to Mar. 1. Based
on the timeline, we can find the related events: First death was
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confirmed in U.S. From figure 6 and 5, we can find that there is
a decrease of the number of sentiment-positive microblogs near
Mar. 15. The key event near Mar. 15 is that the confirmed cases
in the U.S. increased from 1,000 to more than 10,000 during Mar.
10 to Mar. 19. In addition, the U.S. President Donald Trump called
novel coronavirus the ‘China virus’ on Twitter on Mar. 16. Based
on this, Figure 7 shows the Sentiment Index from Feb. 19 to Apr.
15 and the two stages are divided by Mar. 15. We regress the Sen-
timent Index against the number of days from Jan. 1 on the two
parts respectively and report the regression coefficients (coef.) and
t-statistics (t) as: (1) Part-1. coe f . = 0.0111; t = 22.4;P > |t | : 0.000;
(2) Part-2. coe f . = 0.0061; t = 16.923;P > |t | : 0.000. Basically, in
this stage, the overall public sentiment was improving slowly and
the second part is lower than the first part. On the whole, positive
microblogs are more than negative microblogs most of the time,
while there is an obvious negative Sentiment Index near Mar. 30.
On that way two COVID-19 survivors beat the CT technician of a
hospital, which ignited much discussion on Weibo.
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Figure 8: Sentiment in different regions
4.2.2 Public opinion of users from different regions. We present
region-related sentiment in this section. First, we select several
representative regions and show the number of microblogs with
different types of sentiment in Figure 8. Clearly, Hong Kong and
Taiwan hold more positive microblogs than negative microblogs.
The numbers of positive and negative microblogs are close from
overseas and the U.S. Japan posts more negative microblogs than
positive microblogs.
We further present a detailed analysis on the relationship be-
tween sentiment and GDP per capita of a given province of China.
We rank the GDP per capita of Chinese provinces (except for Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) and their positive/negative sentiment
proportions. To compare the two ranks, we use Normalized Spear-
man’s footrule given by:
NFr (r1, r2) = 1 −
Fr |S |(r1, r2)
max Fr |S |
(2)
ÂčÂňwhere r1, r2 are two permutations and |S | is the number of
overlapping items between them, when |S | is odd max Fr |S | =
1/2(|S | + 1)(|S | − 1) and when |S | is even max Fr |S | = 1/2|S |2.
Fr |S |(r1, r2) represents standard Spearman’s footrule as:
Fr |S |(r1, r2) =
|S |∑
i=1
|r1(i) − r2(i)| (3)
ranks NFr
positive (from high to low) & GDP rank 0.13
positive (from low to high) & GDP rank 0.55
negative (from high to low) & GDP rank 0.53
negative (from low to high) & GDP rank 0.18
Table 1: NFr between different ranks of sentiment
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Figure 9: Sentiment Index by different regions of stage 1
NFr (r1, r2) ranges from 0 to 1 and a higher score indicates r1 and
r2 are more similar and the comparison result of different lists is
shown in Table 1. With the results of NFr, we can draw a prelimi-
nary conclusion that the higher GDP per capita a province has, the
more negative microblogs and fewer positive microblogs it has.
Figure 9 shows the Sentiment Index in different regions. The
Sentiment Index is regressed against the number of days from Jan.
1 on the two parts divided by Jan. 21 respectively. The results of
regression are shown in Table 2. Most of the results pass the t-test
expect for the U.S. and the part 2 of Japan. There are several obser-
vations from Figure 9: (1) most of the regions held a positive atti-
tude towards the pandemic before Jan. 21 and there was an clear
decline on Jan. 21 like the overall sentiment in section 4.2.1. Also,
the gradient of the regression equation for most regions is higher
in the first part than the second part; (2) Hubei suffered a signifi-
cant decline near Jan. 21 and the Sentiment Index was close to -0.2
here. Overseas and the U.S. hold a similar pattern, especially the
U.S., the lowest Sentiment Index of the U.S. is close to -0.4; and (3)
Japan holds a declining regression equation in part 1, which differ-
entiates it from other regions.
Figure 10 shows the Sentiment Index in different regions on
stage 2. Sentiment Index is regressed against the number of days
from Jan. 1 on the two parts divided byMar. 15 respectively and the
results of regression are shown in Table 3. We canmake several in-
tuitive observations from the figure 10. (1) Microblogs from Japan
and the U.S. are not enough to support a regression analysis. There
is no significant pattern that the sentiment of these two regions
changed over time; (2) An obvious decline can be observed near
Mar. 30 in some regions like Beijing, and Shanghai. The hospital
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Figure 10: Sentiment Index by different regions of stage 2
Region
Part 1 Part 2
coef. t P > |t | coef. t P > |t |
Beijing 0.0107 3.338 0.003 0.0048 9.743 0.000
Others 0.0169 4.702 0.000 0.0040 9.375 0.000
Taiwan 0.029 3.777 0.001 0.0118 20.934 0.000
Shanghai 0.0126 3.679 0.002 0.0019 3.408 0.002
Guangdong 0.0164 5.120 0.000 0.0044 8.641 0.000
Hong kong 0.0252 4.348 0.000 0.0089 11.637 0.000
Japan -0.0197 -2.440 0.025 -0.007 -5.744 0.000
Overseas 0.0105 3.399 0.003 0.0005 0.917 0.367
Hubei 0.0127 3.243 0.004 0.0039 6.869 0.000
U. S. 0.0110 1.937 0.068 -0.0013 -1.426 0.165
Table 2: Regression analysis of stage 1
Region
Part 1 Part 2
coef. t P > |t | coef. t P > |t |
Beijing 0.0090 12.380 0.000 0.0047 9.563 0.000
Others 0.0116 19.504 0.000 0.0063 13.806 0.000
Taiwan 0.0132 11.406 0.000 0.0041 3.836 0.001
Shanghai 0.0075 6.414 0.000 0.0048 10.972 0.000
Guangdong 0.0095 12.134 0.000 0.0057 14.054 0.000
Hong kong 0.0102 5.746 0.000 0.0050 4.037 0.000
Japan 0.0000 -0.003 0.998 -0.0017 -1.314 0.198
Overseas 0.0054 3.990 0.001 0.0031 6.242 0.000
Hubei 0.0099 12.805 0.000 0.0055 9.217 0.000
U. S. 0.0033 1.268 0.217 0.0022 1.811 0.080
Table 3: Regression analysis of stage 2
fighting event wasmentioned in Section 4.2.1; and (3) There is a de-
cline near Mar. 7 in several Chinese regions like Shanghai, Guang-
dong and outside China regions like Overseas and the U.S. Two
events can be found near Mar. 7: Xinjia Express Hotelwhich served
as a centralized medical observation point collapsed in Quanzhou,
Fujian on Mar. 7. COVID-19 infected Nicola Zingaretti, chairman
of Partito Democratico.
4.2.3 Public opinion of users of different genders. Considering users
of different genders whether their microblogs are positive or neg-
ative, there are 25.2% positive and 12.9% negative in stage 1 and
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Figure 12: Sentiment of different users on different stages
33.0% positive and 6.0% negative in stage 2 for female users. For
male users, there are 16.5% positive and 9.9% negative in stage 1
and 16.6% positive and 4.5% negative in stage 2. Most male and fe-
male users hold a neutral position and the proportions of positive
and negative are close in both stages. What is different is that a
higher proportion of male users post neutral microblogs in stage
1. The ratio of male to female microblogs is 81%, that means more
microblogs are posted by female. An interesting finding is that in
stage 2 the ratio of male to female microblogs is 1.06, which in-
dicates with the development of pandemic, the proportion of mi-
croblogs by male users is increasing.
4.2.4 Public opinion of users with different age. Only user profiles
from stage 2 provide information about their birthdays, allowing
us to analyze the users in stage 2 by considering their age. The
result is shown in Figure 11. Most microblogs were posted by users
from 17 to 34, while most of the positive and negative microblogs
were posted by them at the same time. Users from 17 to 34 prefer
to express their positive and negative opinions.
4.2.5 Public opinion of users with different educational background.
Few users provide their educational background. We filter the ed-
ucational background of a specific user by searching key words
like ’high school student’ in the brief introduction of their profiles.
With the results shown in 12, we can find that microblogs with
higher educational background are more likely to be negative.
5 SPECIFIC TOPICS
5.1 China and the U.S. related microblogs
China and the U.S. are two regions of high interest. We first make
an analysis on the volume of microblogs related to the two topics
on different stages. It is shown that 11.5% microblogs discussing
China and 0.9% microblogs discussing U.S. on stage 1 and on stage
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Topic
Part 1 Part 2
coef. t P > |t | coef. t P > |t |
China 0.0526 6.161 0.000 0.0191 25.709 0.000
U.S. -0.0135 -1.186 0.250 -0.0213 -16.993 0.000
Table 4: Regression analysis on the public opinion of China
and the U.S. during stage 1
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Figure 13: Sentiment Index China and the U.S.
2 there are 18.7%microblogs for China and 8.4% for U.S. We can see
a significant increase in proportion of microblogs discussing U.S.
and China comparing different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Sentiment Indices of the microblogs from Jan. 1 to Feb. 18
discussing China and the U.S. are shown in Figure 13 and the re-
gression statistics are shown in Table 4. We can make several intu-
itive observations: (1) In general, the public attitude towards China
was more positive than towards the U.S. (2) During part 1, the pub-
lic opinion on U.S. was fluctuating and slumped after Jan. 21.
The Sentiment Index and corresponding regression statistics on
Microblogs from Feb. 19 to Apr. 15 discussing the Chinese govern-
ment and U.S. government are shown in Figure 14 and Table 5. It is
shown that the public opinion on the Chinese government is simi-
lar with overall opinion on the pandemic, while the public attitude
towards U.S. government is below them.
Topic
Part 1 Part 2
coef. t P > |t | coef. t P > |t |
China. 0.0119 17.557 0.000 0.0059 13.203 0.000
U.S.. -0.0125 -11.249 0.250 -0.0078 -17.829 0.000
Table 5: Regression analysis on the public opinion of China
and the U.S. during stage 2
Sentiment Index
correlation coefficient
stage 1 stage 2
Overall & China 0.62 0.79
Overall & U.S. 0.26 -0.02
China & U.S. 0.39 0.06
Table 6: Correlation Coefficient on the Sentiment Index of
different topics
02
/1
9
02
/2
4
02
/2
9
03
/0
5
03
/1
0
03
/1
5
03
/2
0
03
/2
5
03
/3
0
04
/0
4
04
/0
9
04
/1
4
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Overall
China
U.S.
Figure 14: Sentiment Index on China and the U.S.
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Figure 15: On the Chinese government in different regions
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Figure 16: On the U.S. government in different regions
We further validate the relationship between the public opinion
on China, the U.S. and overall public opinionwith Pearson Correla-
tion Coefficients and the results are shown in Table 6. The highest
correlations are achieved by overall and China in stage 2 and we
can find satisfied results on overall and China in both stages. In ad-
dition, it is noticeable that the coefficient between the microblogs
of China and the U.S. in stage 1 is 0.39.
We also provide an analysis of the opinion on China and the U.S.
by considering the regions of users. Figures 15 and 16 show the
results of sentiment proportions in different regions. Considering
the microblogs about China, only Japan holds a similar number of
positive and negative microblogs.When it comes to themicroblogs
about the U.S. in Figure 16, there are more negative microblogs
than positive microblogs in most regions.
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Figure 17: Term usage during stage 1
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Figure 18: Term usage during stage 2
In addition, we provide a further analysis onChinese government-
related and U.S. government-related microblogs. Since the volume
of government-related microblogs is not enough to make an analy-
sis based on time, we provide a direct analysis on the volume. Based
on the statistics, the Sentiment Index in all stages for the topic
‘China’ is 0.69 and for the topic ‘U.S.’ is −0.72, and the Sentiment
Index on microblogs directly mentioning ‘Chinese government’ is
0.09 and that for ‘U.S. government’ is −0.96. It is shown that most
microblogs show a negative attitude towards the U.S. and U.S. gov-
ernment, which means the public opinions on them are consistent.
In contrast, there is a significantly higher proportion of negative
microblogs of the Chinese government than China.
5.2 Term Usage
There are different types of terms referring to COVID-19 by users.
For example, controversial expressions which connect region and
virus such as ‘China virus’ and ‘U.S. virus’ are used during the pan-
demic.We show the usage of different terms during different stages
of the pandemic in Figure 17 and Figure 18 It is clear that ‘U.S. virus’
were used more in stage 2. Considering the Sentiment Index on the
different topics of the two stages, ‘China virus’ is -0.50 and -0.68.
When it comes to ‘U.S. virus’, the Sentiment Index in stage 2 is
-0.89.
That means the Chinese public expressed negative sentiment
when using these terms in general. Also, some peaks were influ-
enced by the China-US relationship. For example, on Mar. 19 the
CNN reporters noticed that the ‘corona virus’ in the U.S. Presi-
dent’s speech was manually changed to the word ‘Chinese virus’,
an immediate reaction by using ‘U.S. virus’ can be observed near
Mar. 19.
5.3 Daily life during the COVID-19 pandemic
Next, we discuss several common topics of daily life during the
COVID-19 pandemic: staying at home, washing hands, disinfec-
tion, quarantine, mask and online learning. There are some simi-
larities as well as differences among them andwe will discuss them
as shown from Figure 19 to Figure 30.
5.3.1 General Observations. On most topics about daily life dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic, discussion increased near Jan. 21.
As mentioned before, COVID-19 was officially announced to be
human-to-human transmissible on Jan. 20. and there would be a
quarantine of the Great Wuhan region beginning on Jan. 23. There-
fore, a few days before and after Jan. 21 are the key dates when dis-
cussions on different aspects of daily life influenced by COVID-19
picked up, except for online learning.
Some peaks that appeared in stage 2 are also shared among dif-
ferent topics from Feb. 29 to Mar. 15. There are several key events
during this period: On Feb. 29, the U.S. reported the first death case
of COVID-19; on Mar. 10, the confirmed cases in the U.S. increased
to 1,000; and On Mar. 13 Trump issued the social distancing policy.
Some activities within the Weibo platform also influenced the
discussions by users. For example, many people shared amicroblog
such as ‘Don’t party, go out less, wash your hands and wear masks!
I am using #Weibo avatar pendant#, to fight the pandemic together,
let’s start from wearing a mask’. Slogans like this were shared
amongWeibo users which increased the number of microblogs dis-
cussing daily life and caused the similar patterns on the volumes
of microblogs discussing these topics.
Considering the sentiment polarity, most of the microblogs are
neutral, and the numbers of positive and negative microblogs are
similar from the general opinion, except for washing hands in Fig-
ure 20 and online learning in Figure 27.
For each of the topics, we provide potential influential events
and hot topics on Weibo to match the unique peak(s) of the topic.
5.3.2 Staying at home. There is an obvious peak on Jan. 25 as
shown in Figure 19. On Jan. 25, one hashtag discussing ‘Cooking
failures when staying at home’ was widely shared on Weibo.
5.3.3 arantine. On Mar. 3, 11 new imported COVID-19 cases
were reported in Gansu Province.
5.3.4 Mask. Hubei plans to request emergency support of masks
and other medical supplies near Jan. 22. Also, with the increasing
demand of masks, people start to discuss how to buy masks, differ-
ent types of masks and the price of masks which brings microblogs
with negative information.
5.3.5 Online learning. Feb. 03 is the first workday after Spring Fes-
tival, student start to discuss about online learning. There are some
hot hashtags like ‘#Do not start online teaching before officially an-
nounced school opens#’ near Feb. 04.Multiple provinces confirmed
to delay school opening near Feb. 14.
5.3.6 Washing hands. Peter Navarro warned again about COVID-
19 in memorandum on Feb.3. Most of microblogs mention washing
hands encourage public to keep the good habit which brings posi-
tive emotions.
5.3.7 Disinfection. Different to other topics, disinfection is discussed
widely since Jan. 1. Quarantine and disinfection are the only two
topics which had been concerned by public from Jan. 1. Most of
the peaks of disinfection is similar to other topics.
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Figure 19: Number of microblogs on
staying at home during stage 1
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Figure 20: Number of microblogs on
washing hands during stage 1
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Figure 21: Number of microblogs on
disinfection during stage 1
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Figure 22: Number of microblogs on
staying at home during stage 2
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Figure 23: Number of microblogs on
washing hands during stage 2
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Figure 24: Number of microblogs on
disinfection during stage 2
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Figure 25: Number of microblogs on
quarantine during stage 1
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Figure 26: Number of microblogs on
mask during stage 1
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Figure 27: Number of microblogs on
online learning during stage 1
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Figure 28: Number of microblogs on
quarantine during stage 2
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Figure 29: Number of microblogs on
mask during stage 2
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Figure 30: Number of microblogs on
online learning during stage 2
5.4 Conclusion
TheCOVID-19 pandemic has had an enormous impact on theworld
and we track the public opinion on Weibo during different stages
of the pandemic. Through the analysis of collected data, we find
several factors that may influence the discussions on social media
and public opinion: (1) Different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is clear that in different stages of the pandemic, the public opin-
ion varied. For example, when COVID-19 was officially announced
human-to-human transmissible the discussions on COVID-19 in-
creased significantly. (2) Policies. Major policies during the pan-
demic may ignite conversation, such as the Wuhan lock-down. (3)
China-US relationship. Use of ‘Chinese virus’ by the U.S. Presi-
dent caused heated discussions. (4) Infected celebrities. The news
that the Chairman of Partito Democratico was infected gave rise
to many microblogs about COVID-19 in Italy. (5) User-generated
topics about daily life during the pandemic. For example, a hash-
tag about cooking at home during the pandemic was widely used.
With this work, we provide a multi-faceted data analysis on the
public opinion during different stages of COVID-19 pandemic on
different topics. We hope more detailed analyses such as this can
help understand the public reactions and prepare the public and
governments for a prolonged COVID-19 pandemic or future pan-
demics.
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